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TEACHING PROCEDURE: PAST AND PROLOGUE 
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most courses in Civil Procedure are built on the foundations of four major 
developments in the subject, all of which date from the middle of the twentieth 
century: the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and three landmark decisions of 
the Supreme Court, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,1 International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington2 and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.3  The Federal 
Rules provide the framework in which law is applied and facts are found in 
civil actions by their own force in federal court and as a model for most state 
courts.  Erie, International Shoe, and Mullane provide the constitutional 
structure in which this process of case development takes place.  Most teachers 
take these classic sources of law to be fundamental to the modern course on 
Civil Procedure, as do virtually all casebooks. 
Yet, in the decades since these foundations of Civil Procedure were first 
established, they necessarily have become dated and, to our students, remote 
from the pressing issues that they will soon confront as lawyers.  Lines of cases 
that once were clear and simple now have become complex and difficult, 
diminishing both their value as teaching tools and their interest as subjects of 
scholarship.  The recent decisions of the Supreme Court under the Erie 
doctrine hardly elicit the same level of interest in the classroom or in the law 
reviews as did earlier decisions.  And as law students have found such 
decisions less helpful, practicing lawyers have found them less revolutionary.  
They can, instead, be assimilated or circumvented as the immediate interests of 
current clients dictate.  One generation’s solution to the procedural problems 
that it faced becomes the next generation’s method of creating new problems 
by trying to reach the same goals by other means.  So, for instance, at common 
 
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law and Earle K. Shawe Professor of Employment Law, University 
of Virginia.  I would like to thank my colleagues, Earl Dudley, Rich Schragger, and Ann 
Woolhandler, for comments on an earlier version of this article.  I would also like to thank Karen 
Francis for her research assistance and for her advice as a recent veteran of the course on Civil 
Procedure. 
 1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 3. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
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law, defendants sought to avoid or postpone liability by filing motions 
attacking formal defects in the plaintiff’s declaration or bill of complaint.  
When the Federal Rules replaced formal pleading with discovery as the 
principal vehicle for pretrial proceedings, defendants could use prolonged 
discovery to achieve the same objective. 
The classic elements of the course in Civil Procedure have, as all classics 
do, aged in reality while retaining their youthful elegance and attraction only in 
memory.  The lesson to be drawn is twofold: first, that these classic elements 
of the course no longer serve as well in teaching the basic structure of a 
lawsuit, and with it, the basic legal vocabulary necessary to learn “how to read 
a case”; and, second, that an emphasis upon the classics in Civil Procedure 
neglects the principal reason why our procedural system has evolved in a 
different direction and why our students have reason to become interested in 
this course.  This reason involves the strategic decisions of parties and their 
attorneys.  If every trial represents a failure to reach a settlement, every case 
represents a situation that must be understood, not with the Olympian 
detachment of the academy, but from the desires and needs of the parties and 
their attorneys. 
This second lesson is perhaps the more sensitive of the two, since everyone 
who teaches Civil Procedure—or, for that matter, any course in law school or 
elsewhere—has his or her own techniques for eliciting a lively discussion from 
an otherwise deadening silence.  On this general subject, I do not mean to 
contradict the only sound piece of advice that can be offered: if it works for 
you, use it.  My suggestion only concerns what is likely to work.  The 
transparent elegance of our system of Civil Procedure is no longer likely to 
inspire students (if it ever could) for the simple reason that it is no longer 
transparent (if it ever was). 
For reasons to be elaborated in this comment, the strategic behavior of 
participants in the process should instead be the focus of the course on Civil 
Procedure.  As another disclaimer, I do not mean to suggest that the classic 
elements of the course should be jettisoned.  Such a step is possible (and, I am 
told, has sometimes been attempted at the Yale Law School), but it makes the 
error of going from one extreme to another: from giving too much weight to 
these sources of law to giving none at all.  The orientation of the course is what 
needs to be changed, not materials that have long been accepted as the 
common ground for understanding the subject.  We can continue to accept the 
same materials as foundational, but change what we build upon them.  And, in 
fact, a change in emphasis and degree may be all that is feasible.  In order to 
get beyond the classic sources, it is necessary first to understand them. 
II.  PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH 
Most courses in Civil Procedure take the Federal Rules and the decisions 
in Erie, International Shoe and Mullane to announce basic principles that are 
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developed at greater or lesser length.  Some substitutions perhaps could be 
made in this list, especially for Mullane, using Mathews v. Eldridge4 or 
Hansberry v. Lee5 to illustrate the basic principles of due process.  All of these 
materials promise to give an account of the development of the basic principles 
of Civil Procedure in the twentieth century.  What they fail to do, in ways that 
become more obvious with each passing year, is to deliver on this promise.  
This failure is not to be found in the content or ambition of these sources of 
law, at least as originally formulated, but in subsequent events that 
disappointed the progressive hopes that, rightly or wrongly, were initially 
fostered by them. 
To take one of only several examples that can be found in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rise and fall of Rule 11 followed a curious course 
from radical expansion to doctrinal elaboration to near insignificance.  As 
originally framed in 1938, Rule 11 prohibited only pleadings and other papers 
filed for an improper purpose.  In 1983, the rule was amended to require a 
reasonable basis in law and fact.  But, in 1993, it was again amended greatly to 
restrict the remedies available for violations of the rule, especially in the form 
of attorney’s fees.6  This history of amendment of a single rule differs 
dramatically from the usual narrative characterizing the adoption of the Federal 
Rules as a long overdue rejection of the technicalities of common law 
pleading.  What began as a vehicle of promising legal reform has now become 
itself the repository of ever more complex provisions.  This is true not just of 
Rule 11, but of the rules on service of process and discovery, and through 
judicial interpretation, the rules on class actions and summary judgment. 
The same ever-increasing complexity also holds for leading decisions.  The 
seemingly simple command of Erie—“There is no general federal common 
law”7—now has become an intricate combination of state and federal 
procedures, as in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.8  The minimum 
contacts test for personal jurisdiction in International Shoe has become the 
multi-factor test articulated in the multi-part opinions in Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court of California.9  And the requirement of individual notice 
in Mullane has foundered for many years on the strategic use and abuse of 
notice in class actions, beginning with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.10 
In recounting these familiar, if disappointing, developments, I do not mean 
to lay them at the feet of the course on Civil Procedure.  If we have held a 
mirror up to existing law and found it wanting, we cannot blame the mirror.  
 
 4. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 5. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
 6. For all of these developments, see FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes (1993). 
 7. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 8. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 9. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 10. 417 U.S. 156 (1974). 
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And, for that matter, we cannot blame the reformers who have tried to bring a 
degree of coherence to the law in this field.  They do not have the power of the 
Emperor Justinian who, after compiling his digest of Roman law, had all 
previously available sources of law burned.  Modern law reformers cannot 
aspire to such thoroughness in limiting legal complexity, nor can they be 
assured that even Justinian’s draconian measures proved to be entirely 
successful.  Regardless of the cause, we cannot take the recent trends in Civil 
Procedure as an inspiring narrative of continuous progress that sustains interest 
in our course.  At best, the classic sources of law in this field have posed the 
right questions.  Subsequent developments have yet to offer coherent answers. 
III.  STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND MOTIVATION 
We can take arms against this sea of troubles by trying to diagnose their 
source.  It lies, I think, almost entirely in the strategic behavior of parties and 
their attorneys.  As a systemic matter, participants in litigation adjust to each 
round of reform, such as those represented by the classic sources of Civil 
Procedure, by modifying the means that they use to seek objectives that they 
have always had.  Procedural reform does not change the goals that most 
litigants bring to the process of asserting a claim or offering a defense.  It 
changes only the means—denying some while offering others. As a 
pedagogical matter, the all-too-human motivations of parties and attorneys in 
litigation provide the drama that otherwise can be lost in procedural 
technicalities.  Few outside the small guild of Civil Procedure teachers (and 
perhaps even fewer within it) value procedural maneuvers for their own sake.  
These all take place against the background of the opposed interests of 
adversaries in litigation which, if not always supplying drama worthy of the 
current generation of talk shows, do so with enough regularity to inspire 
general reflections upon the human condition.  An imaginative reconstruction 
of that condition, as it is subjected to the stress of litigation, should give 
students an insight into a process that many of them will soon participate in. 
The consequences of strategic behavior emerge over the long term from 
many different areas of Civil Procedure.  Forum-shopping constitutes one of 
the clearest examples.  Any lawyer with the option of filing or defending a case 
in more than one court will choose the court that best serves the interests of his 
or her side in litigation.  As we all know, Erie descried forum shopping 
between federal and state courts when it was used to affect the choice between 
federal and state law.  This kind of forum-shopping was particularly pernicious 
because it could be accomplished so easily, in many cases simply by going 
across the street from the federal to the state courthouse or vice versa.  
Sometimes, as in the egregious case of Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. 
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v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co.,11 the plaintiff made strenuous 
efforts to manufacture diversity jurisdiction in order to take advantage of 
federal law.  Yet, if the evils of federal-state forum shopping are all too 
familiar, so is the continued prevalence of every other kind of forum shopping: 
between state courts, between federal courts in different states, and at the limit, 
between courts in different nations.  As Lord Denning, the Master of the Rolls 
of the English Court of Appeals, famously remarked, “As a moth is drawn to 
the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States.”12  This kind of forum 
shopping remains unaffected by Erie. 
It is promoted, however, by one of the other classic sources of Civil 
Procedure: International Shoe.  As this decision has increased the reach of the 
long-arm jurisdiction of state courts, it has necessarily decreased the 
impediments to forum shopping for favorable state law.  Thus, in Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc.,13 the Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff’s choice of a 
forum in New Hampshire, motivated entirely by the application of that state’s 
statute of limitations, which was the only one in the country that did not bar the 
plaintiff’s claim by the time it was actually filed.  As federal-state forum 
shopping has faded, state-state forum shopping has prospered, and all because 
attorneys have recognized the strategic possibilities open to them after the 
seminal decisions in Erie and International Shoe. 
Similar examples could be multiplied from the Federal Rules, where the 
history of discovery and sanctions has already been mentioned.  These rules 
closed off the avenues for strategic behavior available in common law 
pleading, but they opened new ones to shift the cost of litigation onto the 
opposing party.  Rule 23 on class actions, especially in combination with the 
right to notice and opportunity to be heard in Mullane, added to the strategic 
possibilities open to both sides in class action litigation.  Plaintiffs and their 
attorneys have taken advantage of the expanded scope of class actions under 
the current version of Rule 23 to assemble nationwide class actions with claims 
reaching into the billions of dollars.  Aggregation of liability on this scale has 
deterred defendants from continued litigation that “bets the company” on the 
outcome of a trial and puts enormous pressure on defendants to settle.  The 
resulting settlements have generated multiple conflicts of interests among the 
named plaintiffs, their attorneys, and unnamed class members. 
Paradoxically, defendants often point to these conflicts as a reason to deny 
class certification, in a litigation strategy that recalls all the morals to be drawn 
from the tale of the fox guarding the henhouse.  Defendants use the same 
strategy to limit or defeat class certification when they invoke class members’ 
 
 11. 276 U.S. 518 (1928). 
 12. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, 1983 2 All E.R. 72 (C.A. 1982) (Lord 
Denning, J.). 
 13. 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
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right to notice under Mullane, as was successfully accomplished in the leading 
case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.  Or, eschewing any high-minded 
consistency, defendants can side with plaintiffs after a settlement has been 
worked out, and insist that all class members are bound by the class action 
regardless of whether they have been given notice or even whether they knew 
they had a claim.  These are the tactics on the defense side that led to the recent 
decisions limiting certification of “settlement only” class actions in Ortiz v. 
Fibreboard Corp.14 and Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.15 
Again, these recent developments are all very familiar.  They may be 
praised, or lamented, or simply accepted as inevitable.  What they cannot be is 
assimilated to the progressive expectations that still surround the classic 
sources of the current course on Civil Procedure.  All of these developments 
are complex enough, with so many shifting shades of black, white and gray, 
that they disprove any confident belief that our procedural system, insofar as it 
adopted the reforms of the middle of the twentieth century, put itself on the 
path of inevitable progress.  By taking these sources of law as foundational, we 
need not accept them as messianic—nor, at the opposite extreme, as 
apocalyptic.  The narrative, not just its message, is what has been lost. 
Instead of laboring to invent a new one—which must be a long-term 
project of understanding long-term trends—I suggest that we take the strategic 
motivation of the parties as the chief feature of the course in Civil Procedure, 
both structurally and pedagogically.  The structural role of strategic behavior 
provides a workable rationale for developments of the last several decades, as I 
have just recounted.  It can also provide a focus for the students’ interest in the 
course.  Beneath the layers of even the most technical issues of procedure lies 
the usually all-too-human dispute that caused a case to make its way to court. 
Just to take one example from a well-known casebook, Layman v. 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.16 concerns the burden of pleading—surely 
among the driest of procedural issues.  Yet the very presence of this issue in a 
reported decision prompts the question of why the lawyers involved saw fit to 
stake the case on such an arcane issue.  Perhaps the author of this casebook 
was extremely diligent in searching for an interesting vehicle for an otherwise 
tedious message, but even so, I doubt that he is alone among casebook authors 
in trying to elicit interest in the cases that he selects.  The plaintiff, Eileen 
Layman, appeared to have been the sole owner of property that the defendant 
telephone company—the usual archetype of the big, bad utility—dug up in 
order to install underground cables.  The utility introduced evidence of a 
recorded easement assigned to it under a “Joint Use Agreement” and prevailed 
for this reason at trial.  On appeal, Ms. Layman argued that the judgment for 
 
 14. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
 15. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
 16. 554 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). 
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the utility had to be reversed because the trial “court erred when it permitted 
the defendant to introduce evidence of an easement when it had pleaded only a 
general denial and not an affirmative defense [based on the] easement.”17 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, following state rules modeled on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reversed and remanded for a new trial.18  
Perhaps the court was technically correct in accepting Ms. Layman’s argument 
that the utility had the burden of pleading on this issue.  But it is difficult to 
believe that Ms. Layman suffered any prejudice from the utility’s failure to 
raise this issue in the technically correct form.  What did Ms. Layman’s lawyer 
think: that the utility just randomly dug up the yards of unsuspecting 
landowners without any color of right?  In fact, representatives of the utility 
seemed to have contacted Ms. Layman before the digging began.19  There 
seems to be no surprise at all, and hence no prejudice to Ms. Layman, from the 
utility’s reliance on the easement as a defense.  Under Rule 15(b), amendments 
are liberally allowed to conform to the evidence at trial.  Still, there appears to 
be no reason why such an amendment would be allowed—or technically, even 
necessary in this case.  So, how could the court of appeals rule against the 
utility? 
This is the real interest of this case and contains a number of morals for the 
would-be lawyer.  First, the utility apparently notified Ms. Layman before it 
went digging up her land, but it did not obtain her explicit agreement that its 
actions were allowed by the easement.  Second, the utility’s lawyers, probably 
brought into the case only after Layman was angry enough to sue, should have 
realized that their unsympathetic client, in an unsympathetic case, would have 
every technical mistake held against it.  And last, but hardly least, perhaps 
there was something more to this story that led a technical procedural issue to 
stand for the injustice of letting the utility company prevail.  In fact, the 
easement literally applied only to wires strung above the ground, not those 
buried under it.20  This defect in the documents supporting the easement should 
have led the utility company to convince Ms. Layman that wires concealed 
below the surface presented less of a problem than wires strung above it.  No 
doubt these issues take the case far from the technicalities of pleading, but that 
is the point.  The merits of the case exercise a pervasive influence even on 
procedural issues seemingly well isolated from them.  If this moral can be 
drawn from a case on how to plead an easement as a defense, I am sure that 
most of the cases we cover in Civil Procedure are open to similar treatment.  
Certainly, I invite my colleagues in the field to try to find them.  Otherwise, we 
 
 17. Id. at 480. 
 18. Id. at 482. 
 19. Id. at 481. 
 20. Id. at 482. 
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leave unanswered—and often unasked—the question of why the parties and 
their lawyers even raised procedural objections in the first place. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
As teachers of Civil Procedure, we might aspire to a vision of our subject 
in which even the least significant detail finds its place within an integrated 
whole.  Nothing is wrong with the aspiration to see our procedural world in a 
grain of sand, however small a part it might be of a concrete case.  Yet, the 
recent history of our subject suggests another view: that despite this aspiration, 
the basic elements of procedure do not often combine into a harmonious 
whole, but instead assemble themselves into the discordant shapes of human 
conflict.  Tracing the effects of these conflicts, on the overall structure of our 
procedural system and on particular cases within it, is a no less worthy goal 
than discerning the abstract symmetries of the system as it stands revealed by 
legal doctrine.  Regardless of the other aims of the course, we would do well to 
make these conflicts, and the motivation that leads to them, one focus of our 
teaching. 
 
